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I NTRODUCTION
The Amazing Spider-man. The X-Men. The Incredible
Hulk. You would be hard-pressed to find someone who does
not recognize these and a number of the other iconic
characters that found their origins on the panel of a comic
book. From their somewhat humble beginnings, comic book
characters have grown into some of the most prevalent—and
lucrative—icons in our popular culture.
They have
transcended the printed page and have spread into almost all
forms of media. Publishing giants Marvel Worldwide, Inc.
(“Marvel”), and DC Comics, Inc. (“DC Comics”), have likewise
become household names through the popularity of their
properties. However, one major group of people is not very
satisfied with this state of affairs: a seemingly growing
number of the original artists and writers—and their
estates—who contributed to the creation of some of these
beloved characters.
Members of this group claim that they have not received
their due recognition and/or compensation, falling victim to
the inadequate bargaining power sometimes inherent in the
publisher-author relationship. 1 These creators have come to
rely on the termination provisions of the Copyright Act of
1976 (“1976 Act”) 2 in their attempts to rectify deals that have
proven to be ill-advised. Congress drafted the termination
provisions of the 1976 Act specifically to remedy situations in
which an author suffered from his or her unequal bargaining
position, resulting in part from the inability to determine a
work’s value until it has been exploited. 3 When termination
is successfully exercised, the grantor reclaims the copyrights
that he had conveyed, placing himself in a position where he
may now obtain remuneration for the work.
A key
consideration in such cases will often be whether the work in
question was made on a “for-hire” basis. Works-for-hire are
explicitly exempt from termination under the 1976 Act,
because the person or entity commissioning the work is
deemed to be the statutory “author” and owns the copyright in
1.
2.
3.
5740.

See e.g., Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002).
17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (2012).
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
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the work, rather than the creator. 4 Thus, if it can be
established that a work was in fact one created “for-hire,” an
attempted termination of copyright transfer will fail because
the original creator technically never owned the copyright nor
had the ability to transfer or assign the rights to the work.
In September of 2009, the heirs of legendary comic book
artist Jack Kirby served Marvel and its licensees Sony (for
Spider-man), Fox (for X-men), Universal, and others with
termination notices for 45 works published by Marvel
between 1958 and 1963. 5 Marvel sued in 2010, seeking
declaratory judgment that the termination notices were a
nullity since Marvel owned the copyrights to the works. 6 The
Kirby heirs counterclaimed for a declaration that the notices
were not a nullity and that they now held the copyrights. 7
The Southern District of New York disagreed with the
contentions of the Kirby estate, and in Marvel Worldwide, Inc.
v. Kirby, decided July 28, 2011, Judge Colleen McMahon
found that the materials in question were works-for-hire,
preventing the Kirby heirs from reclaiming the copyright on
his creations under the termination provisions of the 1976
Act. 8 Since the works were created prior to January 1, 1978,
the date that the 1976 Act went into effect, the court had to
conduct its work-for-hire analysis pursuant to its statutory
predecessor, the Copyright Act of 1909 (“1909 Act”). 9 In the
end, the court found that none of the evidence submitted
could make “so much as a dent in the ‘almost irrebuttable’
presumption that the Kirby works were works-for-hire.” 10
The lawyer representing the Kirby estate, Marc Toberoff, has
expressed his disagreement with the court’s decision, citing
what he called the “arcane and contradictory state of ‘work for
hire’ caselaw under the 1909 Copyright Act.” 11 He has
indicated that he intends to appeal the decision to the Second
4. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 203, 304(c) (2006).
5. Marvel Worldwide, Inc. v. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d 720, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 2011);
Matthew Belloni, Jack Kirby Estate Vows to Appeal Loss in Marvel Copyright Lawsuit,
THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (July 28, 2011), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thresq/jack-kirby-estate-vows-appeal-216642.
6. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 725.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 750.
9. Id. at 737. For a discussion on how the two acts differ, see infra Part II.
10. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 750.
11. Belloni, supra note 5.
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Circuit Court of Appeals. 12
This Note will examine the Southern District of New
York’s decision in Kirby and will ultimately conclude that the
decision of the court is wholly consistent with the aims of
copyright law and beneficial for the continued survival and
prosperity of the comic book industry. To provide insight into
the underlying principles behind the 1976 Act’s termination
provisions, Part I of this note will trace American copyright
law from its goals and underlying rationale to its
implementation through the various copyright acts.
Particular attention will be given to rationale supporting the
changes that have been made and Congress’s desire to
address opportunities afforded to an author to gain
remuneration for a work that has been transferred to another.
Part II will examine and compare the work-for-hire doctrine
under both the1909 Act and the 1976 Act, specifically focusing
on the analysis utilized by courts within the Second Circuit.
Part III will outline the background of the Kirby case and the
decision that the Southern District of New York rendered,
focusing on how the court applied the work-for-hire analysis
to the facts of the case and the reasoning that the court relied
on in reaching its judgment.
I. RENEWAL AND TERMINATION: THE AUTHOR’S ABILITY TO GAIN
REMUNERATION FOR WORKS ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER PARTY
A. The True Purpose of Copyright Law
Copyright finds it origins in what is widely known as the
“Copyright Clause.” 13 Under this provision, Congress has the
power "to Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." 14 It is pursuant to this clause and the Necessary
and Proper Clause 15 that Congress can enact copyright
legislation. 16 Copyright can provide the holder with an
12. Id.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14. Id.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
16. Scott T. Okamoto, Musical Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire: Money
for Nothing, 37 U.S.F. L. REV . 783, 785 (2003) (citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
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immensely valuable piece of intellectual property. Authors
are conferred the right to reproduce their work, prepare
derivative works based on the copyrighted work, distribute
copies of their work, perform or display the work publicly,
and, importantly, copyright owners can also assign the
copyright in their works to another. 17
Deconstructing the ideology behind American copyright
law is an intriguing endeavor. It uncovers certain truths
about American values, society, and business, yet it can be
equally sobering as one reflects on what copyright actually
seeks to protect. One may think that copyright exists for the
benefit of the author or creator of a piece. However, in
actuality “[t]he primary purpose of copyright is not to reward
the author, but is rather to secure ‘the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors.’” 18 Reward
to the owner is merely a secondary consideration. 19 The
prospect of reward serves the purpose of inducing the author
to release to the public the “products of his creative genius.” 20
As articulated by the Supreme Court, “encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors.” 21 Thus,
through copyright, authors are provided with limited
monopoly in their works in order to encourage them to release
those works to the public. 22
This is not a universal view taken by all countries towards
copyright. In fact, European copyright law significantly
differs from American copyright law in its recognition of
moral rights, stemming from a “fundamentally divergent view
of the nature of media, whether art is seen as a cultural
production or merely creative goods.” 23 American copyright
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.02 (2011)(1963) (hereinafter “NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT”)).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
18. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03; see Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127
(1932).
19. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
20. Id.
21. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
22. Ashok Chandra, Crisis of Indefinite Consequence: How the Derivative Works
Exception and the Lanham Act Undercut the Remunerative Value of Termination of
Transfers,16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 241, 250 (2005) (citing
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 158).
23. Sean McGilvray, Judicial Kryptonite?: Superman and the Consideration of
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law has its roots in “consequentialist, economic, and
incentive-based justifications while continental European
copyright law is informed to a greater degree by natural
rights and concern to protect the personality interests of the
author.” 24 The result is that European intellectual property
regimes justify copyright, along with trademark and patent
law, as protecting the creator and his work. 25 Nonetheless,
some scholars have argued that American copyright does not
necessarily reject natural law concepts completely. 26
True, there is not a complete disconnect between American
law and moral rights. The United States officially recognizes
some traditional moral rights such as the “Right of
Authorship” 27 and the “Right of Integrity,” 28 however these
protections are limited to visual artists. 29 Authors have also
utilized other aspects of American law for protection akin to
those that would be afforded by moral rights. 30 For example,
the American system’s prohibition on specifically enforcing
personal service contracts affords creators of works similar
protection to the “Right to Create,” which “prohibit[s] the
completion of a work from being judicially mandated.” 31 One
may also rely on libel law for the same or similar protections
as the “Right of Protection from Excessive Criticism.” 32 In
combating distortions of their work, sometimes creators and
entertainers have been able to find relief under the Lanham
Moral Rights in American Copyright, 32 HASTINGS COMM . & ENT. L.J. 319, 325 (2010).
24. Id. (quoting Justin Hughes, American Moral Rights and Fixing the Dastar
“Gap,” 2007 UTAH L. REV . 659, 662 (2007).
25. McGilvray supra note 23, at 326 (citing F. Willem Grosheide, Paradigms in
Copyright Law, in O F AUTHORS AND O RIGINS : ESSAYS ON COPYRIGHT LAW 205, 207
(Brad Sherman & Alan Strowel eds., 1994).
26. MARGETH BARRETT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 403 (3d
ed. 2007).
27. “Permitting the author to be recognized as author of created work, to publish
as anonymous or pseudonymous, to prevent work from being attributed to another, and
to prevent name from being used on works not created, or distorted.” SHERRI L. BURR,
ENTERTAINMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS IN ESTABLISHED AND EMERGING MEDIA
116 (2d. ed. 2011).
28. “Permitting the author to prevent alterations, distortions or destruction of his
work.” Burr, supra note 27.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 106A; Burr, supra note 27, at 116 (citing Sherri L. Burr,
Introducing Art Law, 37 COPYRIGHT WORLD 22, 24 (Feb. 1994).
30. Burr, supra note 27, at 116.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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Act, which “prohibits false designation of origin and false
description.” 33
Still, aside from these limited exceptions and roundabout
ways of invoking the effective equivalent of the protections
that would be afforded by moral rights, the “[American]
regulatory [system] is reluctant to acknowledge these
rights.” 34 Courts have consistently avoided and rejected
explicit attempts to appeal to moral rights. 35 Yet scholars and
commentators concur that moral rights do have a place within
American copyright law, albeit a discrete one, typically
hidden behind the mask of other laws. 36 Given the status of
moral rights within American copyright law, it should be no
surprise then that there is no clear answer as to what extent,
if any, these considerations actually affect judicial decisionmaking.
Cases of copyright transfer termination under the 1976
Act present an intriguing context in which to apply this
question. In these cases, an author is seeking to reclaim a
copyright in a work he has previously assigned to another
entity. Thus, it is an apt situation in which moral rights may
hold sway and the argument that such cases implicitly
address the moral right of an author to his work has been
made. 37
33. Id. at 117 (citing Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (ABC television
network enjoined from airing their editing of Monty Python television program); 15
U.S.C. § 1125 (2006).
34. Michael D. Birnhack, Copyright Law and Free Speech After Eldred v. Ashcroft,
76 S. CAL. L. REV . 1275, 1294-95 (2003) (noting the limited scope of 17 U.S.C. § 106A
(2000)).
35. See Miller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 299 F.2d 706, 709 n.5 (2d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 923 (1962) (“In any event, the moral right [to prevent the
‘distortion, mutilation or other alteration’ of an author’s work] is not recognized in this
country.”); Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 590 (2d Cir. 1952) (granting relief based on a
contract theory rather than addressing the doctrine of moral rights); Vargas v. Esquire,
164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947) (rejecting plaintiff’s attempt to utilize moral rights
law as recognized by civil law in other countries as an attempt to change the law of this
country); Seroff v. Simon & Schuster, 162 N.Y.S.2d 770, 778 (Sup. Ct. 1957), aff’d, 210
N.Y.S.2d 479 (1960) (author could not hold publisher liable for damage to reputation
from distorted translation of author’s book).
36. See Jonathan Stuart Pink, Moral Rights: A Conflict Between the United States
and Canada, 1 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM . 171, 178 (1994); Roberta Rosentha Kwall,
Copyright and the Moral Right: Is An American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV . 1,
17-24 (1985).
37. McGilvray, supra note 23, at 320.
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B. The 1790 Act through the 1909 Act
The termination rights now afforded to authors were not
always a part of American copyright law. Like most areas of
law, copyright has changed and evolved with time. Unlike
other areas of law, such as contract, copyright itself is a
creature of statute. 38 Congress first utilized the powers
granted to it by the Copyright Clause through the enactment
of the Copyright Act of 1790 (“1790 Act”), which was modeled
after England’s Statute of Anne. 39
The 1790 Act provided for an initial 14 years of protection
with the option to renew the copyright for an additional 14
years. 40 Originally, the purpose of the renewal right was
“merely to serve as an extension of the original term.” 41 Upon
expiration of the original term, the author or the author's
executors, administrators, or assignees could effectuate the
renewal of the copyright. 42 In regards to the renewal term,
there was no reference in the statute to members of the
author’s family, or to any party that was not in the line of
succession. 43 Instead, the first section of the statute provided
that a copyright could be obtained by “a citizen or citizens,” or
“his or their executors, administrators, or assigns,” and then,
in the same section, the 1790 Act granted to such persons a
further term of 14 years. 44 Furthermore, there was no
indication that when an author made an assignment this
transfer would not also include any “extensions,
improvements, and all other incidentals” to the copyright. 45
Thus, when an author transferred his copyright, there was no
38. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 663-64 (1834) (“This right [in copyright] . . .
does not exist at common law—it originated, if at all, under the acts of congress.”); M.
Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 432 (4th Cir. 1986) (“The right of copyright
is a creature of federal statute, with its constitutional base in Article I, § 8, cl. 8.”);
Microsoft Corp. v. Grey Computer, 910 F. Supp. 1077, 1084 (D. Md. 1995) (“Unlike
contracts, copyrights and the rights flowing therefrom are entirely creatures of
statute. . .”).
39. Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (May 31, 1790) (repealed 1909), reprinted in
8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT app. 7[D][1]; Statute of Anne, 8 Anne c. 19, (1790) (repealed
1842), reprinted in 8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT app. 7[A].
40. Copyright Act of 1790 § 1.
41. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 217 (1990) (citing Copyright Act of 1790 § 1).
42. Stewart, 495 U.S. at 217 (citing Copyright Act of 1790 § 1).
43. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Goff, 187 F. 247, 250 (1st Cir. 1911).
44. Id.
45. Id.
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reason to believe that the assignee would not also gain the
right to renewal. 46
Congress altered the renewal rights granted in the
Copyright Act in 1831, and again in 1870; resulting in a
provision which granted to “the author, inventor, or designer,”
if living, or “his widow or children, if he be dead” the exclusive
right of renewal for the additional 14-year period. 47 This
created a new policy in which the original and renewal terms
of a copyright were clearly broken up and the right to renewal
would revert back to the author or his family upon expiration
of the first term. 48 By doing this, Congress was endeavoring
to provide the author with a second chance to control and
benefit from his work and sought “to secure to the author's
family the opportunity to exploit the work if the author died
before he could register for the renewal term.” 49
Congress once again took legislative action with the 1909
Act. This Act would follow its predecessors in providing the
author with an initial copyright period, now extended to 28
years from the date of publication, and a renewal period for a
second 28-year period upon the expiration of the first term. 50
In the debates leading up to the 1909 Act’s enactment,
Congress determined that the two-term scheme should be
retained in order to address the inequality often present in
the bargaining power between the author and the publisher. 51
This scheme would help protect authors who sell their
copyrights, for a relatively small sum of money, to publishers
who go on to reap enormous profits. 52
46.
47.

Id.
Copyright Act of February 3, 1831, 4 Stat. 36, reprinted in 8 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT app. 7[D][4]; Copyright Act of 1870 § 88, reprinted in 8 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT app. 7[D][13][a][Sec. 88].
48. Goff, 187 F. at 250.
49. Stewart, 495 U.S. at 218 (citing Seymour M. Bricker, Renewal and Extension of
Copyright, 29 S. CAL. L. REV . 23, 27 (1955) (“The renewal term of copyright is the law’s
second chance to the author and his family to profit from his mental labors”)).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909 Act) (replaced by the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §
101, et seq.), reprinted in 8 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT app. 6 § 24 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2011) (1963).
51. H.R. REP. NO. 2222 at 14 (1909) (“It not infrequently happens that the author
sells his copyright outright to a publisher for a comparatively small sum. If the work
proves to be a great success and lives beyond the term of twenty-eight years, . . . it
should be the exclusive right of the author to take the renewal term, and the law should
be framed . . . so that [the author] could not be deprived of that right.”).
52. Id.

M URRAY_H ER OE S FOR HI RE

420

4/17/2013 4:07 PM

Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 23.2

The renewal term in effect created a new estate: one “clear
of all rights, interests, or licenses granted under the original
copyright.” 53 It provided a safeguard in the form of an escape
hatch for authors who have made poor bargaining decisions. 54
The author or his family would be able to “get the benefit of
the last half of the monopoly if the work [has] prove[n] [to be]
a protracted success.” 55 It would allow the author to bargain
on more equal footing with the assignee, and fairly
renegotiate the terms of the grant after the value of the work
has been determined through its exploitation during the
initial term. 56
Unfortunately, this proved to be a flawed system, and in
Fred Fischer Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, the Supreme
Court rendered a decision that effectively eliminated the
purpose of the renewal right as Congress had envisioned. 57
The Court held that the second term of copyright was
assignable during the first term. 58 As a result of this decision,
publishers simply began requiring authors to assign both the
copyright and the renewal right. 59 Thus, the renewal right
was left worthless in regard to its most important use.
C. The 1976 Act’s Termination Provisions
Sweeping revisions were made with the 1976 Copyright
Act in order to address the shortcomings of the previous
system. First, the two-term system of the initial copyright
term and the renewal term was changed to a single term
53. G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir. 1951).
54. Chandra, supra note 22, at 251.
55. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: II, 45 COLUM . L.
REV . 719, 722 (1945).
56. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 218-19 (1990); 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.02 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2011) (1963)
(“[U]nlike real property and other forms of personal property, [a copyright] is by its very
nature incapable of accurate monetary evaluation prior to its exploitation.”).
57. Fred Fischer Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943). The
authors of the song “When Irish Eyes are Smiling” assigned both its initial and the
renewal rights to Witmark. Id. at 645. When one of the authors renewed the rights in
his own name, and assigned his renewal interest to Fischer, Witmark brought suit to
enjoin Fischer from publishing and selling copies of the song. Id. at 646.
58. Id. at 659.
59. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5740.
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period lasting the life of the author plus 50 years. 60 As the
Act took effect on January 1, 1978, works created on or prior
to December 31, 1977 still need to be renewed in the manner
of the 1909 Act. 61 However, the 1976 Act granted an
additional 19-year renewal term for such works (making the
renewal term for applicable works run for a maximum of 47
years). 62 The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
further extended this period by 20 years; thus making
copyright last for the life of an author plus 70 years, and for
works of corporate authorship to 120 years after creation or
95 years after publication, whichever is earlier. 63 For works
that were in their renewal term, an extra 20 years was added
onto the 47-year term. 64
Second, Congress instituted a new non-waivable right for
authors who previously assigned their copyrights to another
party in sections 203 and 304(c) of the 1976 Act, which allows
these authors to terminate their transfers. 65 Furthermore,
Congress included the language, “notwithstanding an
agreement to the contrary,” to Section 304(c). 66 This ensures
that an author could not contract this right away, removing
the pitfall of the 1909 Act. The 1909 Act had been deemed a
failure due to its inability to provide authors with
remunerative rights after they had assigned the renewal term
in their copyrighted work before its true value could be
ascertained. 67 Congress sought to fix the problem by allowing
copyright law to trump contract law.
Sections 304(c) and 203 are similar for the most part. 68
Section 203 addresses the reversionary rights of authors who
created works after December 31, 1977, 69 while section 304(c)
retroactively grants a termination right to authors of works
60.
61.
62.
63.
Pub. L.
64.
Pub. L.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).
See id. § 304.
See id. § 304(a)(2).
See id. § 302, amended by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
See id. § 304(a), amended by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
105-298, 112 Stat. 2827.
See id. §§ 203, 304(c) (2006).
See id. § 304(c)(5).
Chandra, supra note 22 at 264.
17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(1), (2), (4), (5), 304(c)(2), (4), (5).
See id. § 203.
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created before January 1, 1978. 70
For section 203,
“[t]ermination of the grant may be effected at any time during
a period of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years
from the date of execution of the grant.” 71 If the grant also
included the right of publication, then the five-year
reclamation period begins “at the end of thirty-five years from
the date of publication … or at the end of forty years from the
date of execution of the grant, whichever term ends earlier.” 72
Similarly, section 304(c) allows authors or their statutory
heirs a right to terminate a grant in a copyright during a
window period of five years, which would begin fifty-six years
after the original grant was made. 73
D. Reasons Behind the 1976 Act’s Changes
Clearly, the 1976 amendments were meant to benefit
authors. 74 By extending the duration of existing copyrights
and providing a longer term for new copyrights, along with
the new, highly author-protective termination rights,
Congress “obviously intended to make the rewards for the
Specifically,
creativity of authors more substantial.” 75
through the termination rights granted by the 1976 Act,
Congress was tackling the same issue that they had similarly
attempted to address with a separate renewal right. 76 The
Witmark decision had ensured that renewal rights as they
stood under the 1909 Act would not offer authors protection
from poor dealings, as Congress had desired. 77 As recognized
by the Supreme Court, like the renewal right before it, the
termination right was enacted with the express purpose of
providing respite for those authors who made “ill-advised and
unremunerative grants” of their copyrights before there was a
fair chance for the author to “appreciate the true value of his
70. See id. § 304(c).
71. See id. § 203(a)(3).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 304(c)(3).
74. Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 172 (1985).
75. Id.
76. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976) (“A provision of this sort is needed
because of the unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from the
impossibility of determining a work’s value until it has been exploited”).
77. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
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work product.” 78
The termination provisions would serve as a compromise,
attempting to ease the existing problems and legitimate need
to rectify the disparity of bargaining power between
publishers and authors, while also furthering the objectives of
copyright law. 79 By providing authors with such favor and
added protection, Congress created a more enticing reward for
authors to release their works to the public. 80 Additionally,
the termination right would also serve the purpose of solving
another issue created by the term extensions that came with
the 1976 Act’s amendments.
In creating the additional 19-year term extension for
works created prior to January 1, 1978, Congress had created
a new property right that would strictly benefit the author or
the assignee of the work. 81 Since Congress wanted authors to
be the beneficiaries of copyright law, the termination right
would ensure that authors were the ones who received the
profits from the newly extended copyright period. 82 Congress
also did not want to give the assignee a potential windfall,
because bargained-for assignments executed before the
passage of the 1976 Act likely would not have contemplated
compensation for the new extension of the copyright term. 83
However, Congress realized either the author or the assignee
would receive this windfall. 84 Since Congress intended the
new rights to benefit authors, the termination rights allowed
the author to receive the windfall, “assuming the work is
profitable and the author or his heirs desire to reclaim it.” 85
Considering these longstanding attempts by Congress to
provide authors with increased rights and protections for
78. Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 172-73 (“[T]he termination right was expressly
intended to relieve authors of the consequences of ill-advised and unremunerative
grants that had been made before the author had a fair opportunity to appreciate the
true value of his work product. That general purpose is plainly defined in the legislative
history and, indeed, is fairly inferable from the text of § 304 itself”).
79. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976).
80. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
81. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 140 (1976).
82. See id.
83. See id. at 141.
84. Id.
85. Id.; John Molinaro, Who Owns Captain America? Contested Ownership, Workfor-Hire, and Termination Rights Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 21 G A. ST. U.L. REV .
565, 573-74 (2004).
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their work, and the justifications that are provided for doing
so, one can see how natural moral rights may be an implicit
factor in this aspect of American copyright law. Obviously,
there is something morally compelling about an author
fighting to reclaim his creations, 86 and courts may be sensitive
to the author’s plight. Some commentators argue that courts
are not immune to such considerations. They assert that
while decisions are not expressly based on moral rights, there
is sometimes an observable willingness to factor moral rights
concerns into the determination. 87 This willingness can be
best evinced by decisions that focus less on the economic
implications and contractual obligations created by the
parties but instead opt to factor natural moral rights concerns
into the equation. 88
Regardless, the result of the 1976 Act is that authors are
meant to be placed in a more favorable position than ever
before. 89 Yet, while authors who have assigned their rights
are blessed with these benefits, it is a different story for those
who have made works on a “for-hire” basis, as Congress has
expressly prevented this group of creators from exercising this
termination right. 90
II. WORK-FOR-HIRE DOCTRINE
To one that is unfamiliar, a work-for-hire may not seem
that different than an assignment. In both cases one
individual creates a work and another individual or entity
owns the copyright in that work. While the difference
between a work-for-hire and an assignment of rights in a
work may seem slight in some instances, there is, in fact, a
critical distinction. Termination is available to original
86. McGilvray, supra note 23 at 335.
87. Id. at 333. McGilvray specifically discusses the decision rendered in Siegel v.
Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2008), as an example of how
an author’s moral rights can be a factor in American copyright law.
88. Id.
89. Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 172 (1985) (“The principal purpose of
the amendments in § 304 was to provide added benefits to authors. The extension of the
duration of existing copyrights to 75 years, the provision of a longer term (the author’s
life plus 50 years) for new copyrights, and the concept of a termination right itself, were
all obviously intended to make the rewards for the creativity of authors more
substantial.”).
90. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 304(c) (2006).
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creators who have assigned the copyrights to their works, but
Congress has explicitly excluded creators of work-for-hire
material from exercising this termination right. 91
Copyright protection initially vests with the author or
creator of a work; however this is not without exception. 92
When a work is “made-for-hire” the employer or other entity
commissioning the work is instead considered the author of
the work, even though the original creator never assigned or
bargained away the rights in the work. 93 Thus, the original
creator of a work-for-hire “falls outside the scope of the policy
rationales that led to the creation of the [1976 Act’s]
termination right.” 94
This being so, whether a work can be considered “for-hire”
will often be a critical issue in copyright assignment
termination cases. The analysis used to determine whether a
particular work is a work-for-hire will depend on which
copyright act applies. 95 Works made before January 1, 1978
are governed by the 1909 Act, while works made after that
date are governed by the 1976 Act. 96 Each act has a different
definition of what qualifies as a work for hire. 97
A. Works-for-Hire under the Copyright Act of 1909
While the 1976 Act has laid out detailed definitions of
work-for-hire, 98 the 1909 Act mentions the work-for-hire
doctrine only once: “In the interpretation and construction of
this title…the word ‘author’ shall include an employer in the
case of works made for hire.” 99 The terms “employer” and
“works made for hire” are not defined in the 1909 Copyright
91. See Id. §§ 203, 304(c).
92. See id. § 201.
93. Id.; Penguin Group Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193, 203 (2d Cir. 2008); Terry
Hart, Marvel v. Kirby: Work for Hire and Copyright Termination, COPYHYPE (Aug. 3,
2011),
http://www.copyhype.com/2011/08/marvel-v-kirby-work-for-hire-and-copyrighttermination/.
94. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121 (1976); Molinaro, supra, note 85 at 574.
95. Hart, supra, note 93.
96. Id.; Marvel Worldwide, Inc. v. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d 720, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(citing Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 1994)).
97. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006), with 17 U.S.C. § 26 (repealed 1976), reprinted
in 8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT app. 6 § 26.
98. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201 (2012).
99. 17 U.S.C. § 26 (repealed 1976), reprinted in 8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT app. 6 §
26.
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Act; instead, that task was left to the courts. 100 Thus, courts
generally applied the work-for-hire doctrine only in cases
involving a traditional employer/employee relationship until
the mid-1960s. 101 However, in 1965, the Ninth Circuit became
the first to apply the doctrine to a case in which an employer
commissioned a work by an independent contractor. 102 This
was the origin of what became known as the “instance and
expense” test.” 103 The court held that where one person
engages another to create a “work of an artistic nature,” the
presumption arises that the copyright belongs to “the person
at whose instance and expense the work is done.” 104
Other circuits also came to adopt the instance and expense
test created by the Ninth Circuit, 105 most notably the Second
Circuit, “where a majority of copyright cases are litigated,” 106
including the Kirby case. 107 In Battleboro Publishing Co. v.
Winmill Publishing Corp., the Second Circuit explicitly
adopted the Ninth Circuit’s Gertler holding in which the court
found that an independent contractor is an "employee" and a
hiring party an "employer" for purposes of the statute if the
work is made at the hiring party's "instance and expense.” 108
The “instance and expense” test is met “when the motivating
factor in producing the work was the employer who induced
the creation,” 109 and the employer has the right to “direct and
supervise the manner in which the work is carried out.” 110
100. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 737.
101. Dumas, 53 F.3d at 554 (citing Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
490 U.S. 730, 749 (1989)).
102. Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1965).
103. Hart, supra note 93.
104. Gertler, 352 F.2d at 300 (“When one person engages another, whether as
employee or as an independent contractor, to produce a work of an artistic nature . . .
the presumption arises that the mutual intent of the parties is that the title to the
copyright shall be in the person at whose instance and expense the work is done”).
105. See, e.g., Murray v. Gelderman, 563 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1977).
106. Hart, supra note 93 (citing Brattleboro Publ’g Co. v. Winmill Publ’g Corp., 369
F.2d 565, 567-68 (2d Cir. 1966)).
107. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 738.
108. Brattleboro Publ’g, 369 F.2d at 567-68.
109. Siegel v. National Periodical Publ’ns, Inc., 508 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1974)
(quoting Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972)) (internal quotations omitted).
110. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 738 (quoting Martha Graham Sch. and Dance
Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 634-35
(2d Cir. 2004)).
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To meet the “instance” prong, while the commissioning
party’s inducement must serve as the motivating factor, it is
not a but-for test, i.e. “but for the artist’s employment the
work would not have been created.” 111 Rather, the courts
engage in a narrower inquiry based on the nature and scope
of the business between the parties. 112 Furthermore, a
written agreement is not necessary to prove that a work was
made at the “instance” of the hiring party. 113 The focus is
instead placed on the actual relationship between the parties,
and the determinative question will be whether the hiring
party had the power to control or supervise the creator’s
work. 114
Within the Second Circuit, the “expense” prong will be
satisfied in a situation where a “hiring party simply pays an
independent contractor for…his or her work.” 115 However,
where the creator of a work is instead granted royalties as
payment, such method of payment would weigh against the
finding of a work being one created “for-hire.” 116 The focus of
this prong rests on which party bore the risk of the work’s
profitability. 117 The Second Circuit’s jurisprudence creates
“an almost irrebuttable presumption that any person who
paid another to create a copyrightable work was the statutory
‘author’ under the ‘work for hire’ doctrine.” 118
B. Works-for-Hire under the Copyright Act of 1976
The work-for-hire doctrine is more specific and limited
under the provisions of the 1976 Act. The 1976 Act included
new work-for-hire provisions, which laid out more detailed
111. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 738 (citing Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entertainment
Inc., 658 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2009)).
112. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 738.
113. Id. at 741.
114. Id. (citing Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 552-53 (2d Cir.
1984); Playboy, 53 F.3d at 554).
115. Id. (quoting Playboy, 53 F.3d at 555). In Playboy, the fact that Playboy paid
the artist a fixed sum for each of the works that were in turn published in their
magazine was enough to satisfy the “expense” requirement of the instance and expense
test. Playboy, 53 F.3d at 555.
116. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 742 (quoting Playboy, 53 F.3d at 555).
117. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 742 (quoting Siegel, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 1058)
(emphasis omitted).
118. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 738 (quoting Estate of Burne Hogarth v. Edgar Rice
Burroughs, Inc., 342 F.3d 149, 158 (2d Cir. 2003)) (internal quotations omitted).
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definitions of the doctrine than had previously been
statutorily available under the 1909 Act. 119 “These provisions
represent a deliberate attempt by Congress to apportion
copyright entitlements in such a way as to appease both
‘employers/buyers’ and ‘employees/sellers’ of copyrightable
works.” 120 17 U.S.C. § 101 splits the term “work made for
hire” into two categories. 121 First, “a work prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment” will be
considered a “work made for hire.” 122 Second, a work that is
“specially ordered or commissioned” will also be considered a
“work made for hire,” however, the parties must expressly
agree that the work will be considered as such in a written
and signed instrument. 123
This construction greatly limits the circumstances in
which the work of an independent contractor may be
considered a work-for-hire. Works created by an independent
contractor must fall within the second subsection of the
definition provided under §101 and therefore must fit into one
of the enumerated categories. 124 Furthermore, the parties
(commissioning entity and independent contractor) must
expressly agree in writing that the work will be considered a
Finally, since Congress has included a
work-for-hire. 125
definition in the 1976 Act, “the Supreme Court held that the
‘instance and expense’ test does not apply for works created
under the 1976 Act.” 126
While the Supreme Court held that the “instance and
expense” test would no longer be utilized for newly created
works, it also rejected the notion that the term “employee”
119. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201 (2006).
120. Michael Carter Smith, Work For Hire: Revision on the Horizon, 30 IDEA 21, 21
(1989).
121. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘work made for hire’ is (1) a work prepared by an employee
within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or
commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a
compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an
atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the
work shall be considered a work made for hire.”).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Hart, supra note 93 (citing Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490
U.S. 730 (1989)).
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should be limited to “formal, salaried” employees. 127 Instead,
common law rules of agency will control a court’s
determination as to whether a work was created within the
scope of employment. 128 “These rules place the actual nature
of the relationship between the two parties above whatever
language issued in any written agreements between them.” 129
Therefore, it is recognized that the 1976 Act is far more artistfriendly than the 1909 Act. The 1976 Act substantially
narrows the scope of works-for-hire when the party
commissioned to create the work is not an employee of the
commissioning party. 130
Whether a particular work is a work-made-for-hire or not
has numerous implications, but the doctrine is especially
significant when it relates to the question of a creator’s
termination rights. 131 This is the central issue at play in
Kirby.
III. BACKGROUND AND THE CASE: MARVEL WORLDWIDE, I NC. V.
KIRBY
A. History Behind the Case
Circa 1940, artist Jack Kirby, along with longtime
collaborator and fellow legend in the comic book industry, Joe
Simon, 132 produced comics for a man named Martin Goodman
at a company called Timely Comics (“Timely”), the
predecessor to Marvel. 133 Simon was then serving as the first
editor of Timely. 134 At some point during the 1940s, both
Kirby and Simon left the employ of Timely, leaving the
company with a vacant editor position. 135 In the meantime,
127. Reid, 490 U.S. at 742 n.8.
128. Id. at 751.
129. Hart, supra note 93.
130. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 737 n.2.
131. See Mills Musics, supra note 78.
132. Simon and Kirby jointly created Captain America and a number of other comic
book series such as “The Sandman,” “The Newsboy Legion,” and “The Boy
Commandos.” Comiclopedia: Joe Simon, LAMBIEK COMIX-STRIPS, http://lambiek.net/
artists/s/simon-joe.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
133. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 731.
134. Biography of Joe Simon, MARVEL COMICS DATABASE , http://marvel.wikia.com/
Joe_Simon (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
135. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 731.
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Goodman asked an assistant at Timely whose previous duties
included sharpening pencils, fetching lunch, and erasing
pages, to function as editor and art director until he found a
suitable replacement for the position. 136 That assistant was
none other than Stan Lee, who Goodman never replaced, and
who remained editor at Marvel until the early 1970s. 137
Thus, during the period in which the Kirby works that
became the subject of this lawsuit were created, Lee was
serving as art director and editor. 138 In this capacity, Lee
developed the ideas and stories for all of Timely’s comic books
at the time. 139 He was responsible for the “creative editorial
aspects” of the comics published. 140 Lee supervised the
creation of the comic books from beginning until end and
nothing was published without his approval. 141 Lee assigned
artists to work, edited or even completely changed their work,
set deadlines for submissions, and gave artists directions and
guidelines as to what they should draw. 142 Lee could make
any changes to artwork or scripts that he deemed fit, often
without consulting the artist or writer. 143
It was amid this setting that Kirby returned to Marvel and
contributed to the creation of several comic book characters
including the Fantastic Four, Spider-man, Thor, the X-Men,
and the Hulk. 144 Most, if not all, of Kirby’s contributions to
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 731.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 732-34. Specifically, Kirby’s contributions are as follows: The Fantastic
Four: In 1961, after Lee was told by Goodman to create a team of superheroes to
compete with National Comics’ (a predecessor to DC Comics) “The Justice League of
America,” Kirby and Lee discussed ideas for the first issue at a plotting conference.
Kirby subsequently produced the pencil drawings for the issue; The Incredible Hulk:
Co-created by Lee and Kirby in 1962. Kirby drew the first issue; The Mighty Thor:
First published in 1962, Lee created a plot synopsis and another writer, Lawrence
Lieber, wrote the script for the first issue. Kirby drew the art for the first issue; SpiderMan: In 1962, Lee developed the initial concept and assigned Kirby to create the first
issue’s artwork. Lee did not like Kirby’s initial pencil drawings of the character and
reassigned the comic book to artist Steve Ditko. Kirby then drew the cover for Spiderman’s first appearance in the comic book “Amazing Fantasy”; Iron Man: Also written by
Lieber, based on a plot conceived by Lee, the character would first appear in “Tales of
Suspense” in 1963. Kirby drew the cover of the issue, but did not contribute to the
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these creations were made through a collaborative process
termed the “Marvel Method.” 145 Under this system, artists
would meet with Lee for a “plotting conference” where Lee
would describe his general ideas for the story to the artists. 146
Then, the artist would draw the story along the lines of Lee’s
main theme, thus allowing artists to work before actually
being given a script. 147 This allowed Lee to keep multiple
artists working on assignments simultaneously while
providing the artists greater opportunity for involvement in
the creative process. 148
Even under the Marvel Method, artists did not work “on
spec;” 149 they began to draw only after receiving an
assignment and plot synopsis from Lee. 150 Artists were
always constrained by Lee’s plotlines and Lee retained the
right to edit or alter the artists’ works. 151 Lee could even
reject them altogether. 152 On occasion, Lee did exercise these
powers and would ask artists such as Kirby to make changes
to their works. 153 Kirby always obliged these requests. 154
Kirby did much of the work in his own home, using his
own tools and supplies. 155 He worked 12-14 hours a day, was
other artwork; The X-Men: In 1963, due to the popularity of the Fantastic Four,
Goodman asked Lee to create another superhero team. Lee conceived the idea and
Kirby drew the artwork for their first appearance; The Avengers: Together in 1962, Lee
and Kirby developed another team of superheroes that would consist of other existing
Marvel characters. Lee created the initial plot and Kirby drew the first issue,
published in 1963; Ant-Man: First published in 1962, Lee had the idea for a miniature
superhero. Lieber wrote the script and Kirby drew the pencil artwork for the first
issue; Nick Fury: Based on a discontinued series from the World War II era, “Sgt. Fury
and His Howling Commandos,” Lee brought the character back to life and oversaw
production using the Marvel Method. Kirby was assigned to draw the artwork for the
new series, which would be first published in 1963; The Rawhide Kid: Because
Goodman enjoyed westerns and titles that used the word “kid,” Lee developed this
comic book, writing the first issue. Kirby drew the pencil artwork. Id.
145. Id. at 732.
146. Id.
147. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 732.
148. Id.
149. On a speculation basis; with no assurance of profit. THE FREE DICTIONARY,
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/on+spec (last visited Feb 22, 2013).
150. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 732.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 731.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 741.
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paid on a flat per-page basis, and never received royalties for
his work. 156 He worked his own hours and paid his own taxes
and benefits. 157 There was no written agreement between him
and Marvel during this time. 158 In the spring of 1972, long
after the creation of all of the works at issue in the case,
Marvel and Kirby executed a written agreement which
assigned to Magazine Management Company, another Marvel
predecessor, “any and all right, title, and interest [Kirby] may
have or control” in all of the work that he created for
Marvel. 159 Kirby eventually died in 1994. 160 He was survived
by his wife and their four children. 161
B. The Decision of the Southern District of New York
The lawsuit began in September 2009. 162 The attorney to
the estate, Marc Toberoff, has garnered some fame through
his past involvement in lawsuits on behalf of people who
created properties that have been exploited by large
companies for huge amounts of money. 163 Perhaps most wellknown from his representation of the families of Jerome
Siegel and Joe Shuster, the original creators of Superman,
Toberoff is responsible for recently obtaining a key ruling in
2008 in favor of the Siegels against DC Comics. 164 This time,
Toberoff would see a different result.
Since the works in question were created before January 1,
1978, the Copyright Act of 1909 controlled the analysis as to
whether the material would be considered a work-for-hire. 165
156. Kirby, 777 F. Supp 2d at 732, 743; Paul Fakler, Doctor Doom Prevails: SDNY
Holds Jack Kirby’s Iconic Contributions to Marvel Comics Characters Were Works for
S( C) ITE
FOR
COPYRIGHT LAW (July 29, 2011),
Hire,
TITLE 17: THE
http://title17.net/2011/07/doctor-doom-prevails-sdny-holds-jack-kirbys-iconiccontributions-to-marvel-comics-characters-were-works-for-hire/.
157. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 741.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 734.
160. Id. at 724.
161. Id.
162. Id.; Belloni, supra note 5.
163. Matt Rorie, Marvel Wins Big In Jack Kirby Estate Lawsuit, SCREENED NEWS
(July 28, 2011), http://www.screened.com/news/marvel-wins-big-in-jack-kirby-estatelawsuit/2665/.
164. Id.; Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
165. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 737 (citing Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d
549, 553 (2d Cir. 1994)).
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As mentioned in the previous section, a work must satisfy the
instance and expense tests to be considered a work-for-hire
under the 1909 Act. 166 Under the instance and expense tests,
which are less rigid than that used for works made under the
Copyright Act of 1976, a creation is considered a work-for-hire
when the “motivating factor in producing the work was the
employer who induced the creation” 167 and the commissioning
party has the right to “direct and supervise the manner in
which the work is carried out.” 168
The court found that the evidence offered to show that
Kirby’s works were made at Marvel’s instance was
“overwhelming.” 169 This finding was supported by a simple,
yet crucial, fact – Kirby did not work until he was told to do so
by Lee. 170 The court struck down the Kirby estate’s argument
that there was no written agreement between Kirby and
Marvel, and therefore no legal right to control Kirby’s work,
because a written agreement was not essential to the creation
of a contractual relationship. 171 When it looked at the actual
relationship of the parties, the court concluded that it was
undisputed that “Marvel did control and supervise all work
that it published between 1958 and 1963.” 172
The court found that the expense prong was in Marvel’s
favor as well, since it was Marvel, not Kirby, who bore the
risk of the comic books’ failure. 173 This decision was made
despite the acknowledgment that Kirby had to use his own
tools and supplies to create the works for Marvel. 174
Furthermore, it did not matter that there was no legal
obligation on Marvel’s part to purchase all the work that
Kirby submitted, or that Marvel on occasion had rejected

166. Brattleboro Publ’g Co. v. Winmill Publ’g Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567-68 (2d Cir.
1966).
167. Nat’l Periodical Publ’ns, Inc., 508 F.2d at 914 (quoting Picture Music, Inc. v.
Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972)).
168. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 738 (quoting Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found.,
Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 635 (2d Cir.
2004)).
169. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 742.
170. Id. at 739.
171. Id. at 741.
172. Id. (emphasis omitted).
173. Id. at 743.
174. Id. at 741.
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Kirby's work, or told him to revise it. 175 Rather it mattered
which party bore the risk for the entire product, the published
comic book itself. 176 Regardless of the comic book’s eventual
success, Marvel bore the cost of printing the book and paid
the artists their fees before publication. 177
Furthermore, the manner in which Kirby was paid for his
work supported a finding for Marvel. 178 The Second Circuit
views the payment of a flat sum for work sufficient to meet
the expense test. 179 Therefore, the fact that Kirby was paid a
flat sum for each page he submitted, and was not paid any
royalties, persuaded the court to rule against the Kirby
estate. 180
The court’s findings made Marvel the presumptive author
of Kirby’s creations unless Kirby’s heirs could rebut this
“almost irrebuttable presumption” with evidence to the
contrary. 181 Unfortunately for the Kirby estate, the court
found the evidence that was proffered unconvincing and that
it did not even make a “dent in the almost irrebuttable
presumption.” 182 The Kirby heirs attempted to utilize the
1972 Agreement as proof that Kirby had a right in the works,
which were subsequently contracted away through the
agreement. 183 The court disagreed. 184 It found that the 1972
Agreement did not offer evidence that Kirby had any rights to
give away in the beginning, but merely that he gave away any
rights he “may” have had. 185
The Kirby heirs emphasized that the 1972 Agreement
included a provision assigning “any and all right, title and
interest [Kirby] may have or control” to Marvel. 186 They
argued that this provision made no sense if Marvel already
owned the copyrights on Kirby’s creations as works made-for175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 742.
Id. at 743.
Id. at 742.
Id. at 743.
Id. at 741-42.
Id. at 732, 743.
Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 743, 750.
Id. at 750.
Id. at 744.
Id. at 745-46.
Id. at 745.
Id. at 744.
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hire. 187 Nonetheless, the court was not receptive to the
argument. Relying on the date the 1972 Agreement was
executed, the court held that the parties likely entered into
this agreement because of Marvel’s uneasiness over
uncertainty caused by the 1976 Act and its limited definition
of works-for-hire, even though the 1976 Act would not apply
to works made before 1978. 188 The agreement also likely
sought to eliminate any form of common law copyright claims
that Kirby could have over the works. 189 This was because
prior to the 1976 Act, common law copyrights existed in
unpublished work. 190 Entering into the 1972 Agreement
ensured that Kirby could not bring claims over any of his
unpublished material, such as the works rejected by Lee. 191
Thus, the court found that the Kirby works were created
on a work-for-hire basis, which precluded the Kirby estate
from terminating Marvel’s copyrights under the 1976 Act.
CONCLUSION
While Congress may have created the termination of
transfer provisions in the 1976 Act to allow authors a second
chance to benefit from their works, 192 it did not mean to place
authors in a better position than publishers. The goal was
merely to level the playing field and address the gross
inequality between these two parties that had previously
existed. 193 This is the reason that the work-for-hire doctrine
still exists and continues to serve a crucial place in copyright
law. The continued observance of the doctrine is meant to
benefit publishers and other entities that commission creators
in their works, ensuring that they still have some power in
the face of the new rights granted to creators by the 1976 Act.
The creators of works that have been made on a “for-hire”
basis are not those who Congress sought to afford added
protections with the 1976 Act’s termination provisions. 194 The
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 744.
Id. at 745-46.
Id. at 746.
Id.
Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976).
Id.
See supra Parts I(d) and II.
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policy rationales and other considerations that spurred
Congress to enact these changes to the copyright law simply
do not exist in the work-for-hire context. 195 Thus, the creator
of a work-for-hire is not entitled to the same treatment as an
author of a work that has been assigned to another party.
While to some this may seem harsh, this is a necessary result.
The work-for-hire doctrine is situated in a critical position
in achieving the goals of copyright law – the inducement of
creators to share their works with the public. 196 Through this
doctrine, commissioning entities, such as publishers, have an
incentive to enter into relationships with creators that result
in the issuance of creative goods to the market. While we
may often perceive a copyrighted work as being the fruit of
the creator’s labors, the commissioning entity frequently
makes a substantial contribution to its creation as well. In
many cases, had it not been for the commissioning party’s
funding of the creator or its undertaking of the risk in the
success of a work, the material may never have found its way
into the public’s hands.
The comic book industry itself is a great example of the
benefits of the work-for-hire doctrine. Without the doctrine,
these characters could not have been developed to the extent
that they have been through these many decades with the
input of multiple artists, writers, editors, and other such
creators. By allowing publishers, such as Marvel or DC
Comics, to maintain ownership of these copyrights, the
characters were able to grow and evolve well beyond their
initial conception.
These properties also benefit from the publisher’s oftenvast resources, whether it is monetary or otherwise. It is
through these resources and investments that mechanisms
such as advertising and merchandising can be utilized,
contributing to the success of the property. More likely than
not, writers, artists, and other such creators simply do not
have the same ability to exploit such opportunities. Thus,
while these creators may have created the artistic work, its
overall success may be more attributable to the toils of the
publisher who holds the copyright.
195. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 121; Molinaro, supra note 85, at 574.
196. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03; see United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
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Courts must be cautious when such disputes over
ownership rights arise.
These cases are particularly
vulnerable to abuse resulting from emotional appeal. It is
romantic to think of an author suing the large corporation to
re-obtain the works that he put his heart and soul into. But
judges cannot be controlled by their emotional impulses;
rather, they must adhere to the law. That is what Judge
McMahon knew when she decided Kirby.
In a commendable fashion, Judge McMahon quickly
separated the emotional aspects of the case from the legal
analysis at the outset of her opinion. 197 The case was not
about whether Kirby and other freelance artists who worked
for Marvel were treated “fairly” when Marvel grew rich off of
the characters they helped create. 198 It was about whether
Kirby’s work qualified as a work-for-hire under the 1909
Act. 199 And the court found that it did. 200
The Southern District of New York was correct in its
decision. A contrary ruling would have resulted in an unfair
windfall for the Kirby estate. There has been exceptional
success with these properties, perhaps best exemplified by the
huge box office success of comic book films such as The Dark
Knight, Iron Man, and Spider-Man. 201 It would be difficult to
determine how much of that success is owed to the original
creator and how much is owed to the efforts of the publisher
197. Marvel Worldwide, Inc. v. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d 720, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“At
the outset, it is important to state what this motion is not about. Contrary to recent
press accounts and editorials, this case is not about whether Jack Kirby or Stan Lee is
the real ‘creator’ of Marvel characters, or whether Kirby (and other freelance artists
who created culturally iconic comic book characters for Marvel and other publishers)
were treated ‘fairly’ by companies that grew rich off the fruit of their labor. It is about
whether Kirby’s work qualifies as work-for-hire under the Copyright Act of 1909, as
interpreted by the courts, notably the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. If it does, then Marvel owns the copyright in the Kirby Works, whether that is
‘fair’ or not. If it does not, then the Kirby Heirs have a statutory right to take back
those copyrights, no matter the impact on a recent corporate acquisition or on earnings
from blockbuster movies made and yet to be made.”) (citation omitted).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 750.
201. All three of these films have made it to the Top 50 List in domestic grosses
with, as of February 9, 2013, The Dark Knight earning $534,858,444, Spider-Man
earning $403,706,375, and Iron Man earning $318,412,101. Domestic Grosses, BOX
O FFICE MOJO, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/alltime/domestic.htm (last visited Feb. 22,
2013).
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and the many others who contributed to the development of
these characters through the years. Furthermore, a victory
for the Kirby estate would have likely opened the floodgates
to mass-litigation commenced by others hoping to get their
hands on at least a sliver of these highly lucrative pieces of
intellectual property. 202

202.

See Molinaro, supra note 85, at 590.

